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AS A PROCESS OF LEARNING
Xiaobo Zhang, Arjan de Haan and Shenggen Fan
The rapid growth in the Chinese economy despite the fact that its
economic institutions and policies appear gravely inadequate against the
propositions of mainstream economic theory has posed many puzzles to
development economists. As pointed out by Summers (2007), in the past
three decades, China has experienced the same degree of industrialization
that took two centuries to occur in Europe. While many foreign observers
frequently highlight the institutional constraints hindering China’s devel-
opment progress, it continues to have maintained record levels of
economic growth and poverty reduction. The Chinese experience has
been widely studied (Qian, 2003; Fan, Zhang, and Zhang, 2004; Hofman
and Wu, 2007; Lin, 2007; Ravallion, 2007). For example, Lin (2007)
argues that China’s rapid growth is due to its shift in development strategy
from capital intensive to labor intensive, in line with China’s comparative
advantage. However, there are still many myths and questions about the
internal processes and logic that drove the reform. Most of the previous
studies provide ex post assessment of the major reform measures, yet offer
little insight into the internal, political processes of reform.
Many of the approaches used in the reform process are unorthodox
from a standard neo-classical paradigm (Rodrik, 2004). It is possible that
heterodox reform measures may be too China-specific to be transferable
to other countries, but some of the policies and strategies behind the
reform process may transcend international borders, and we believe in the
potential of drawing out the lessons from China’s development path for
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the broader development community. The successes of these reforms may
challenge traditional neo-classical economic theory, and the much debated
Washington or post-Washington Consensus.
We follow a framework on the process of economic change developed
by North (2005). He views development as arising from incremental steps
by many decentralized agents which shape the formal rules and informal
norms and hence the overall economies. Policy change entails uncertainty
to human beings. People often have different interpretations of the uncer-
tainty associated with proposed change, and each interest group has its
own perceived payoffs and risks from proposed policy changes. In
essence, reforms are ways to break the existing, less desirable equilibrium
among different interest groups and move it to a more favorable one.
Facing a binding constraint, there are potentially many solutions.
Therefore, successful reform strategies help to enlarge the choice sets,
reduce the perceived risks, and improve the understanding of potential
payoffs of different policy options.
To understand how the reform process in China originated and why it
succeeded, distinguished policymakers and researchers who were
involved in the reform process present their textured and first-hand
accounts of the reform process. This narrative approach provides a rich
story about the reform processes and is instrumental in helping generate
hypotheses which can be tested by quantitative methods. Several common
themes emerge from the case studies. The key ingredients are summarized
here, focusing on the use of crisis as an opportunity, experimentation
with regionally-specific policy formulation and reform, sequencing, infor-
mation flow and consultation, and institutional capacity in addressing
barriers to reforms.
1.1. Use the Crisis as an Opportunity
Vested interest groups evaluate the risks and payoffs with regard to the
consequence of proposed policy change. People often have different
perceptions of the uncertainty related to change. Although crisis is bad by
definition, it may help radically revise perceived risks and payoffs of
certain policy options. A crisis can also redesign policy priorities where
new approaches emerge out of previous failures, a process that we are
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witnessing during 2008–2009 after the financial crisis, with a radical
reorientation towards a more inward-oriented development model,
and intense political discussion about the directions of these reforms.
Despite the negative effects of any crisis, crises necessitate change and
re-examinations of current policies. We use several examples in this book
to illustrate how crisis may beget reform.
After the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), China was on the verge
of collapse under the planned economy system. More than two-thirds of
people lived under one dollar per day (Ravallion, 2007). With stagnant
agricultural growth and fast population growth, food was in short
supply. At the onset of reform, it seemed China faced extremely high
barriers to escaping the low-level equilibrium trap where poverty
persisted. However, as shown in the chapter by Du Runsheng, one of the
architects of China’s rural reform, a crisis may trigger reforms. After the
end of the Cultural Revolution, both the top leaders and masses realized
that the planned system was not a viable option anymore and there was
a consensus to change it. Under this circumstance, the top leaders were
more willing to listen to different opinions and to allow open policy
debate. In other words, crises may provide reformers with a window
of opportunity to push their reform agenda. Reforms do not come auto-
matically and require policymakers to seize this as an opportunity.
Reform policies must be developed in a timely fashion after crises to be
a legitimate alternative.
One noted example is the rural reform documented by Du, presented
in Chapter 2 of this volume. Farmers who experienced the Great Famine
in the late 1950s and early 1960s still had a vivid memory of the disaster
and they knew the collective farming did not work in times of crises.
So with another imminent weather shock looming in 1977, the local
government in Fengyang County, Anhui Province, decided to contract the
collective land to farmers because they knew the collective farming
system could lead to another famine in the event of a severe shock.
Yao (2007) provides an extensive review of land tenure changes in rural
China. He argues that when the household responsibility system (HRS)
was scaled up, despite some initial resistance, most farmers welcomed the
reform measure wholeheartedly because they knew collective farming did
not work.
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China’s village elections, described in Chapter 6 by Wang Zhenyao,
are another notable example. Until the mid-1980s, both the head and
party secretary of a village were appointed by the upper-level govern-
ment. With the rapid abolition of people’s communes, and the shift of
production from collective farming to the household responsibility sys-
tem in the late 1970s, the appointed leaders lost their political
legitimacy. Many villages failed to provide basic public goods and serv-
ices. The conflict between cadres and villagers over taxation became
increasingly serious. Facing this pressure, the central government started
to embrace the idea of grassroots elections, previously taboo, by giving
local people a larger say in their local affairs. After several years of
experimentation, the central government called for widespread imple-
mentation in the early 1990s.
The third example is the Wenzhou model, described by Zhu Kangdui
in Chapter 5 of this volume. Wenzhou used to be one of the poorest
regions in China. At the war frontier to Taiwan in the planned economic
era, the central government had made little public investment in the
region. Together with geographical isolation and high population/land
ratio, many people fled elsewhere to escape starvation. Because they
were so poor prior to reforms, Wenzhou people wanted to change to have
a better life. The local government officials respected popular demand.
They lobbied the central government to grant them permission to conduct
policy experiments on rural industrialization in Wenzhou. They supported
the grassroots reforms of vast number of entrepreneurs to overcome
institutional barriers faced by private enterprises. At the time, it was ille-
gal for a private enterprise to hire more than eight workers. In order to
avoid direct conflicts with the legal system and to reduce the high trans-
action costs caused by branding, many private enterprises resorted to
some makeshift practices such as attaching themselves to a legal enter-
prise or organization to avoid the ownership risk of hiring more than
eight workers in a private firm. Local governments accepted these prac-
tices as well. In addition to allowing those “wearing red hats” (private
firms registered as TVEs), the local government conducted many institu-
tional reforms to create an enabling environment for private business.
Not only have Wenzhou’s reforms promoted its local economy, but they
have also provided valuable experience for China as a whole.
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1.2. Crossing the River by Touching the Stones
Having observed the disastrous performance of the ideology-based
process in the planned economy era, such as the Great Famine
(1959–1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), in 1978 the
Communist Party’s 11th Congress shifted the policymaking process from
ideology-based to evidence-based under the slogan of “seeking truths
from facts”. This approach places great weight on demonstrated evidence
on the ground instead of on theory. The policymakers adopted a program-
matic attitude toward reform (“crossing the river by touching the stones”).
The success of the economic reform in the past 30 years triumphs the
virtues of this incremental reform strategy. All the chapters in this
book illustrate one of the distinguishing features of China’s reform
experience — that economic success has been a process of gradual and
sequential reforms, consciously avoiding “big-bang” approaches.
Pragmatism, trial and error, and experimentation with small-scale policy
reforms that are later scaled up are key features of China’s reforms.
Learning by experimentation is a key strategy in reforms, particularly
when facing huge uncertainty. When facing choices never seen before, it
is extremely risky for agents to make radical choices. In such circum-
stances, experimentation can be a useful tool to search for more
information and test and update hypotheses. Experiments yield infor-
mation to help understand what works and what does not work. Even
failures can be helpful because they can help eliminate unfavorable
options, as shown by Luo Xiaopeng’s case study (Chapter 3). The failure
of his price reform experiment in Hebei Province helped him come up
with the idea of dual-track price reform. Although this idea was dismissed
by Murphy et al. (1992) as provoking drops in output in the Soviet
Union due to increased arbitrage and corruption, the dual-track price
reform is an important example of an experiment where the “Washington
Consensus” wisdom was contradicted.
The multi-faceted fiscal and tax reforms described in Chapter 7 by
Liu Zhongli and in Chapter 8 by Weng Lihua similarly show the gradual
(and long-term) nature of successful reform. The fiscal reforms of the
early reform phase contributed towards decentralization, but greatly
reduced the national fiscal income. Reforms in the first half of the 1990s
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involved a range of measures to allocate taxes between governments and
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), creation of separate state and regional
tax bureaus, and ways to link tax returns to regional economic growth
rates — and as Liu Zhongli emphasizes, the optimization of resource allo-
cation in the context of Chinese specific circumstances remains a challenge.
Moreover, experimentation can help control the possible disastrous
consequence of wrong choices. A wrong choice, at large scale, may be
irreversible, and therefore may undermine political stability and weaken
the learning capacity. Most of the experiments presented in this book were
not random. Most of the experiments started in isolated, poor areas.
As shown in the chapter by Du, the leaders purposely situated the pilot
experiment of the household responsibility reform in remote provinces to
avoid negative spillovers and to reduce political resistance. One reason
that Wenzhou received the special permission to be a pilot of rural indus-
trialization was because of its rather isolated location at the time. Overall,
most experiments were insulated from the wider society and economy.
This means that in the event of failure, repercussions are contained. It
should be noted that these experiments were not randomly designed as
advocated by mainstream development economists (Duflo, 2005). 
The experiments and demonstrations allow individuals to become
acquainted with proposed changes, to reduce perceived risk and to better
understand the possible payoffs. As vividly documented in Wang
Zhenyao’s case study (Chapter 6), China conducted numerous pilots of
village elections before scaling up. When the idea of village elections was
first put forward, it received strong resistance. Nonetheless, the central
government encouraged some provinces to conduct pilot experiments.
The success of these experiments helped reduce the perceived risks of
village self-governance. This led the People’s Congress to pass the imple-
mentation amendments to the Organic Law in 1992.
Similar to the pilot stage, in the implementation stage too many
counties followed a two-step process. First, the county civil affairs bureau
selected several townships for the village elections experiment. In the
second step, the county civil affairs bureau analyzed and summarized
the experience from pilot experiments, adjusted election rules, and then
encouraged countywide elections. Throughout the whole process, the civil
6 Xiaobo Zhang, Arjan de Haan and Shenggen Fan
b858_Chapter-01.qxd  4/14/2010  9:56 AM  Page 6
NARRATIVES OF CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORMS - How Does China Cross the River?
© World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
http://www.worldscibooks.com/eastasianstudies/7589.html
affairs bureau organized many meetings to facilitate the exchange of
experiences and lessons. The descriptions of fiscal reforms in Chapters 7
and 8 similarly highlight the consultative nature of reforms, and in the
case of Zhejiang Province the space for regional differences in policy
implementation.
The post-Mao era in China adopted an evidence-based policymaking
process. Most successful reforms have undergone pilot experiments and
impact evolutions before being scaled up. Although the experiments were
not rigorously and scientifically conducted by including control groups,
the pilots enabled researchers to observe what worked and what did not
on the ground.
1.3. Right Sequencing is Crucial
One of the lessons from the Chinese reform experience is the right
sequence of reform policies. Beginning with agriculture ensured that the
majority of the population benefited from the initial reforms (for example,
the increase in the procurement price), given the overwhelming dependence
of the population on the primary sector. The large number of prospective
beneficiaries also helped generate consensus and create political support
for the subsequent stages of the reform process. The various incentive
reforms — including the new land tenure laws, the rise in procurement
prices, marketing reforms, and exchange rate interventions — led to an
improvement in returns for farmers and in the efficiency of resource
allocation in the economy. As a result, the domestic production base was
strengthened and gradually made more competitive.
Integration into the world market through trade liberalization was
attempted only after these land, price and other reforms were successfully
implemented. The success of the early agriculture-led reforms also
increased the demand for non-agricultural goods and released a surplus of
labor and capital into the rural non-farm sector. As the rural non-farm
economy thrived, it provided farmers and rural areas with an additional
investment source outside agriculture and its allied sectors, and it put
pressure on the urban economy to reform as well, since non-farm enter-
prises in rural areas became more competitive than SOEs. These
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successes triggered macroeconomic reforms and also favored the opening
up of the economy and the adoption of measures such as the special
economic zones to increase foreign investment.
1.4. Information Biases
For policymakers to make evidence-based decisions, it is key to have
information on the payoffs and risks of different policy options. While a
large population like China’s is likely to produce many good ideas and
solutions to problems, its size also makes it more difficult to aggregate
the scattered ideas and feed them back to the policymakers. In a non-
democratic society, the problem of asymmetric information may be
particularly serious. 
Due to China’s vast size and uniquely centralized governance
structure, there is a huge information asymmetry between the top policy-
makers and people on the ground. The case studies illustrate different
ways to reduce the information asymmetry. First of all, it is important that
policymakers at the top realize that they are likely to be subject to infor-
mation bias (as in the “emperor’s new clothes”). In China’s case, as
documented by Dr. Luo, after the Cultural Revolution, the top leaders
were extremely willing to look for the best ideas on the ground. Due to
lack of other communication channels, think tanks (such as the Rural
Development Research Center led by Mr. Du) played a key role in the
initial reform period by searching for best practices, piloting policy experi-
ments, and analyzing and feeding recommendations back to the Chinese
leadership. At the time, there was also an atmosphere of tolerating different
views. The leadership had de-politicized collective learning, as described in
Chapter 3 by Luo Xiaopeng. This open debate in the now famous
Moganshan Conference in 1984 stimulated the invention of the idea of the
dual-track pricing. Facing large uncertainties in policy reform, open policy
discussions can play a key role in expanding the choice set and increasing
the likelihood of finding best solutions.
Secondly, for a large country such as China, each region may face dif-
ferent binding constraints, and it is hard to come up with a one-size-fits-all
strategy. Under this circumstance, giving local governments freedom to
explore the best solutions to their local binding constraints becomes
crucially important in innovations. As shown in Zhu Kangdui’s case
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study, the success of the Wenzhou model of industrial privatization lies
largely in its continuous experimentation and innovations which were
implicitly supported or at least not opposed by the central government.
In the formulation of migration policies, as described by Professor Cai
Fang in Chapter 4, the central government encouraged local governments
to try different reform measures. One virtue of China’s vast size is that, as
long as experimentation is allowed, the chance of finding a best solution
to challenging problems is quite high. Moreover, the best practice has
strong externalities. Not only does it have a huge demonstration effect for
other regions, but it can also be scaled up. Both the Wenzhou model and
village election case studies highlight this point.
1.5. Reducing Resistance to Reform
Even if a good reform measure has been identified, reformers still need an
effective strategy to reduce political resistance. Faced with a planned
reform, some vested interest groups may perceive a loss as a result of it.
A successful reform strategy should try to reduce opponents’ perceived
risks and protect their interests, at least in the short run.
Take the household responsibility system (HRS) as an example.
Its principle is that individual households can claim the balance after ful-
filling the grain quota to both the state and collective units. Under this
arrangement, the rent claim rights on agriculture products belong to
peasants. The key condition is that farmers must meet the compulsory
quota to the state before selling the extra production to the market.
Because peasants could possess the entire balance after fulfilling the state
quota, their enthusiasm for production dramatically increased. The
improved incentive system immediately resulted in the full utilization
of the long-term investments by the state in agricultural research and
development, irrigation, and other infrastructure.
While with hindsight it is clear that the design of the HRS was a
great success, most province governors opposed it in the beginning, on
ideological grounds. As a response, the reformers proposed to conduct the
HRS pilots in the most remote provinces. In doing so, either the success
or failure of the pilots would not affect other richer provinces which per-
ceived higher risk in the HRS. Most governors agreed with the idea of
pilots in remote provinces. In the next year, the pilots showed powerfully
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that the HRS greatly improved agricultural productivity while its risk was
minimal. With the new information on payoffs and risks, almost all the
provincial governors reversed their opposition in favor of the HRS in the
next year. The HRS was quickly scaled up nationwide.
Prior to reform, in the hierarchical property right and entitlement
system, urban sectors, particularly SOEs under the control of the central,
provincial, and municipal governments, enjoyed privileged access to a
variety of scarce materials and capital goods through quotas. There were
few quotas, however, for other lower-level SOEs and even fewer for
collectively-owned enterprises. The dual pricing system, as described by
Luo Xiaopeng, allowed SOEs to sell unused input quota at market price
to township and village enterprises (TVEs) which were outside the
command economy. Such exchanges not only protected the original
privileges of higher ranking entitlements, but also presented TVEs with
opportunities to access industrial inputs via market channels and to
participate in the market economy. In other words, the dual pricing system
provided a functional pricing mechanism for rent sharing through both
hierarchical and market systems. Because the dual-price reform initially
did not have a negative impact on the SOEs’ entitled planned quota, resist-
ance to the reform was muted. Over time, as the private sector grew
rapidly and the market price and planned price converged, the dual-track
was eventually unified into a single-track or market price.
1.6. Institutions and Capacity
Finally, any reform must be built upon existing institutions and capacity.
It is hard to establish new institutions from scratch. Local people usually
have much better tacit knowledge on the strengths and weaknesses of their
own institutions. Therefore, they are more likely to have better ideas to
engineer institutional change than an outsider. No doubt, the knowledge
stock from the outside world is extremely useful — but the key is how to
facilitate the exchange between external knowledge and indigenous
knowledge to solve local problems. Having the capacity to learn and adapt
to changing environments is an essential condition for the success of any
reform. Undoubtedly, China has a rather strong top-down governmental
structure. Once a decision is made, the speed of implementation is much
10 Xiaobo Zhang, Arjan de Haan and Shenggen Fan
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faster than in many democratic countries. International observers have
been struck by the efficiency which with China “gets things done”, once
priorities are recognized. For example, policies on agricultural develop-
ment, rural industrialization, migration, the control of SARS, HIV/AIDS
prevention and harm reduction, and currently the responses to the
2008–2009 financial crisis have been rapidly implemented at the local level.
The top leadership’s commitment to reform also played a key role in
pushing reform forward. In particular, Mr. Deng Xiaoping advocated
a pragmatic approach for reform by relying on empirical evidence and
experience on the ground rather than on dogmatic beliefs from textbooks.
It was the top leaders who granted wide space for local governments
to experiment. Zhejiang Province’s bold experiment of abolishing rural
taxation proved that the benefits of the reform far outweighed the costs.
As a result, this policy was quickly scaled up (Chapter 8). Certainly, the
strength of civil service ensured the implementation of various reforms
(Ravallion, 2007).
Cai Fang’s case study on migration policy (Chapter 4) shows the
importance of adaptive efficiency and tacit knowledge. In the planned
economic era, China implemented a strict migration policy, the so-called
Hukou (household registration system), restricting people to their natal
places. The government was afraid that a sudden abolishment of the
Hukou system could lead to massive inflows to cities and create slums.
With this concern, governments took a gradual approach to lessen the
control on human mobility. Initially, it allowed farmers to go to cities to
sell agricultural products, such as vegetables and fruits. Next, the food
coupon, which permitted one to purchase grain and other food products
from certain locations, was abolished so that people could buy grain at
the market price anywhere. This enabled many farmers to live in cities.
In response to the death of a college student who was beaten to death for
lacking an identification card in Guangzhou, the central government
passed a law to prohibit law enforcement from checking people’s ID and
other paperwork on the street. This made migration much easier than
before. As more and more rural people work in the cities, urban resi-
dents are gradually finding that they cannot live without the necessary
services provided by the rural people. Recently, many local govern-
ments have abolished the Hukou system, and since the last National
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Party Congress migrant workers have become represented in national
politics.
Thus, the case studies in this volume show that learning by experi-
mentation is a key feature of China’s reform process. While there is
justifiably a lot of excitement about what China has achieved, the success
has also created a range of problems such as access to healthcare and basic
education in the countryside, the environmental costs of development
policies, and groundwater pollution in agriculture.
As China has accumulated huge foreign reserves and fiscal revenues,
policymakers may become overconfident about their contribution to the
economy’s success. The recent policy debates indeed show an increasing
confidence, and China seems to be among the few countries able to
manage the current financial crisis even though growth rates have dropped
greatly in China too. Under this complacency, one is more likely to make
centralized decisions, neglecting the wisdom from local levels and the
virtues of experimentation. The reform stories presented in this book
highlight the virtue of pragmatism and experimentation in the reform
process. To overcome emerging challenges, it is important that policy-
makers continue to focus on innovations from local levels with a
pragmatic attitude.
1.7. Are There Lessons for Other Countries?
Leaders from developing countries, notably Africa, have shown great
interest in China’s economic success and record of poverty reduction.
Development scholars have noted that China’s rise challenges the funda-
mentals of development theory. We return to this question in the last
chapter of this volume, with a review of the growing literature on the
subject and a consideration of the way in which policy learning occurs.
In conclusion to this introduction, we highlight that such lessons for
others are not easily drawn. This is not only because the context of China
is so different from that of most other countries. The key to China’s
success and ways in which it addresses emerging challenges is clearly the
pragmatism and understanding that solutions need to be based in local
contexts, combined with a political drive to promote reforms and the
space given — by necessity or otherwise — to local experimentation.
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The international community is gradually moving away from an
understanding that China’s reforms are still “partial”, to a better empirical
understanding of how the reforms took place, how and why they were
initiated, and what successes and challenges emerged as a result. We hope
that the contributions in this volume make a modest contribution to under-
standing China’s development path, and thus also enrich the global
development debate.
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